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Using Trade to Enforce
International Environmental Law:

Implications for United States Law
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*

The United States has enviable domestic environmental protection
laws.'
However, good domestic environmental protection raises two
concerns: effectiveness and competitiveness. Regarding effectiveness,
environmentalists well understand that effective environmental protection
cannot stop at one state's borders. Controlling air and water pollution,
ozone destruction, and threats to wildlife in the United States will not
eliminate those problems as long as other states continue destructive
practices.2
Regarding competitiveness, United States environmental
protection laws can pose a competitive disadvantage when businesses in
other states do not face tie same regulations
In response to these two problems of environmental protectioneffectiveness and competitiveness-members of Congress introduced over
thirty bills in 1990 to amend U.S. trade laws. The bills were designed to
either press other states to adopt environmental protection standards similar
to the United States' own or to at least minimize the competitive
disadvantage for U.S. business inherent in U.S. regulations.' The bills took
one of two approaches: either they aimed at restricting access to U.S.
markets for those states failing to honor international environmental
commitments, or they levied duties on imports from states failing to protect
the environment.5

* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. Currently, Visiting Professor,
Institut fUr Intemationales Recht und V61kerrecht an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitt, Miinchen.
1. For an overview of U.S. and European law, see TURNER T. SMITH, JR. AND PASQUALE
KROMAREK, UNDERSTANDING U.S. AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1988).
2. For references to numerous writers who take this view, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing
the New InternationalLaw of the Environment, 35 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 293 (1992).
3. See Kenneth Berlin and Jeffrey M. Lang, Trade and the Environment, 16 WASH. Q. 35, 42-43
(1993).
4. Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade-A Multilateral Imperative, I MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 231, 232 (1992).
5. Id. at 251.
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Most of these bills faded from the scene, but several statutes in the
environmental area already include such measures.6 The Marine Mammal
Protection Act (MMPA) was adopted in 1972 and amended in 1987, 1988,
and 1992. 7 The MMPA prohibits the killing of marine mammals except in
a few circumstances, including those incidental to commercial harvesting of
fish. However, the number of dolphins that may be killed incidental to
commercial fishing must be limited! U.S. fishermen have been limited to
killing 20,000 dolphins annually. 9 The Act also tries to ensure the
effectiveness of the protection measures and limit the potential for creating
competitive disadvantage for U.S. fishermen by forbidding the import into
the United States of fish caught by fishermen from countries that do not
protect marine mammals.' 0 Following a lawsuit to enforce the MMPA,' I
the United States imposed an embargo on imports of tuna caught by
Mexican fishermen. Mexico argued that the embargo violated the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2 and took the United States to
a GATT dispute resolution panel in Geneva to press this view. 3 The panel
agreed with Mexico and the United States withdrew the embargo. 4
The GATT panel could have reached the opposite decision within the
parameters of the GATT if environmental protection had been a priority.
But it is clear that the panel was more concerned about protecting the
integrity of the international trading rules from unilateral actions. This
concern-whether the United States or others can lawfully take unilateral
action to protect the environment-is the topic of this paper. Congress has
amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to meet the criticisms of the
GATT panel. 5 Yet the Act continues to require unilateral action in some

6. See infra note 45.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988). See also International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-523 (1992).
8. 16 U.S.C. §1371 (1988).
9. See David J. Ross, Making GA IT Dolphin-Safe: Trade and the Environment, 2 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 345-47 (1992).

10. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988).
11. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
12. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade regulates trading relations among over 100
member countries. For the basic agreements see, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1947). For further discussion of
GATT regulations see infra, footnotes 57-62 and accompanying text.
13. Mexicans Ask GA T to Settle Tuna Row, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at 5.
14. The panel decision is reprinted at 30 I.L.M. 1594; see also N.Y, TIMES, Mar. 20, 1992, at
B10.
15. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, supra note 7.
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cases and is probably, therefore, still inconsistent with the GATT. Other
U.S. statutes also contain provisions for unilateral action. The Pelly
Amendment, for example, may require the embargo of products from Japan
and Norway if those States resume commercial whaling, as they have
recently threatened to do. 6
Unilateral actions are lawful under public international law. Under the
customary international law doctrine of countermeasures, states may take
otherwise unlawful action in response to prior unlawful action as long as the
response is necessary and proportional. Thus, the United States may
continue to take action against environmental breaches through trade
measures that violate the GATT when it can show that it is responding to
an unlawful action and the measure is necessary and proportional.
The international enforcement system has few mechanisms beyond
unilateral action for enforcement. It is understandable, therefore, that the
system permits unilateral action despite the criticisms of such measures
voiced by the GATT panel and other critics. Their presence in U.S. statutes
past and future is consistent with international environmental laws.
The use of unilateral countermeasures does have negative aspects. They
are self-judging and thus open to abuse and they are far more available to
wealthy countries than to poor ones. These criticisms deserve serious
consideration and should underscore for governments that international law
imposes important limitations on the use of countermeasures. Nevertheless,
the point of this article is to underscore that countermeasures are the only
means of enforcing most international environmental laws.
The article will begin with an explanation and assessment of the use of
countermeasures to enforce international environmental protection. It will
then argue that the MMPA authorizes a lawful countermeasure, despite the
GATT decision. The article will further argue that countermeasures, even
with their acknowledged deficiencies, are nevertheless lawful and can play
a role in international environmental protection and in meeting concerns of
effectiveness and competitiveness.

16. Andrew Pollack, A FirstStep to Create a Sanctuaryfor Whales, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May
15-16, 1993, at 2.
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I. COUNTERMEASURES

When the United States imposed an embargo on the import of Mexican
tuna in order to induce Mexico to stop using fishing techniques destructive
of the environment, it was imposing a countermeasure on Mexico.
Countermeasures, viewed strictly, are the only means of enforcing most
international environmental law. International law does have some courts
and arbitral tribunals, but courts adjudicate, they do not enforce. If a state
does not comply with a court order, countermeasures must be used to
enforce it. Trade sanctions are the most available form of countermeasures
and trade thus plays a central role in environmental enforcement. To better
understand this role, it is helpful first to contrast countermeasures with
related categories of state action, in particular dispute settlement, compliance
techniques,
and
implementation
techniques,
before discussing
countermeasures per se.
A. Categories of State Action
According to Black's Law Dictionary, "to enforce" means to "compel
obedience."' 7 Thus "dispute resolution" techniques are not technically
enforcement techniques, despite the frequent use of the term "enforcement"
when discussing dispute resolution. 8 In dispute resolution, parties employ
some means of resolving a dispute regarding what legal obligation is owed.
The common forms of dispute resolution in international relations are
adjudication, negotiation, mediation, and conciliation.t 9 While international
law does not have a domestic-type compulsory court system, the
International Court of Justice does have some compulsory jurisdiction and
all states may bring disputes if the parties to the dispute agree to do so."°

17.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990).

18. Writers often mention that the Vienna Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer and the
Montreal Protocol thereto, see infra, note 26, have no enforcement mechanisms. They really mean they
have no binding dispute resolution provisions. See also, e.g., Charles DiLeva, Trends in International
Environmental Law: A Field With Increasing Influence, 21 ENVT'L L. REP. 10076 (1991). ("Despite
widely supported goals, international environmental agreements lack enforcement mechanisms-a factor
that many observers consider a major weakness of international law.")
19. For a further description of these terms, see Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS 573-75 (2nd ed. 1989).
20. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
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States have also created other types of dispute resolution bodies such as the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the dispute resolution panels of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.2
Mexico brought its dispute
with the United States over tuna harvesting to a GATT dispute resolution
panel to obtain an authoritative, third-party clarification of whether the
United States could lawfully impose an embargo on Mexican tuna exports
consistent with the GATT. Hungary and Slovokia have agreed to go to the
International Court of Justice to determine whether Slovokia has the right
under international law to build a dam across the Danube.2 2 But in any of
these cases, the party that receives support for its position may still need to
enforce the decision if the other party fails to comply voluntarily.
Dispute resolution techniques can play a useful role in inducing
governments to comply with obligations in cases where they otherwise
would not. For example, in the well-known Air Services Arbitration, France
refused to allow certain aircraft to land in Paris under the terms of a U.S.French air services agreement until a dispute resolution tribunal ruled that
France's interpretation of the agreement was wrong.23 On the other hand,
international law contains many examples where states have refused to
comply with decisions. In the Nicaragua Case, the United States refused to
comply with orders of the International Court of Justice.24 Even with the
use of enforcement techniques, Nicaragua could have done little to get the
orders enforced.2
Despite the Nicaragua case and some other cases which demonstrate the
limits of dispute resolution, it is still unfortunate that so many recent
multilateral environmental treaties do not have binding dispute resolution
provisions. 6 Good dispute resolution measures can obviate the need for
enforcement in some cases, although the point here is that they are not the
same.

21. For a recent review of international courts, see INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (Janis ed., 1992).
22. Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung. v. Slovakia), I.C.J., Press Release No. 93117, July 5,
1993.

23.

Air Services Agreement Case (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 416 (1978).

24. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 891, 927 (1990).

25.

Id.

26.

See, e.g., The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:

Framework

Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849; Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, pmbl., 26 I.L.M. 1520 (1987) (entered into force, Sept. 22, 1988).
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Another term often confused with dispute resolution is "compliance."
States are under an obligation to comply with their international duties.
Many techniques exist to encourage or assist states in complying, but these
are not enforcement techniques.27 Compliance techniques are used at the
stage prior to a determination that a breach of obligation has occurred.
Roger Fisher has recommended in his book Improving Compliance with
InternationalLaw that the obligations of international law be formed with
a view to achieving compliance so as to never reach the enforcement
problem. Indeed, international law as a consent-based system does tend to
create rules with which states are pre-disposed to comply.29
Other
compliance techniques include monitoring, reporting systems, and
contingency funds.
The new Framework Convention on Climate Change 30 contains many
compliance techniques but no binding dispute resolution provisions. For
31
example, parties must report on steps taken to implement the Convention.
The Convention establishes a "Subsidiary Body for Implementation" to help
the parties review the reports. 32 Reporting and review are methods which
have been used in the human rights field and were found to have some
impact on state behavior.
"Implementation" is another term often confused with enforcement.
Implementation refers to the further steps states must take as required by a
convention. Thus if a state is supposed to limit the production of ozonedepleting chemicals but does not adopt the necessary domestic legislation to
accomplish this, it has failed to implement the Montreal Protocol and has
failed to comply by not implementing. The Convention has a means to
assist states in complying through its implementation fund.

27. "Compliance as a concept denotes an act of yielding or acceding to some wish or demand.
That is, through compliance, one consents to act in conformity or in accordance with some specific
desire, request, condition, or direction. Compliance by a state with international law is generally
demonstrated by that government's willingness to accept as binding constraints various rules, regulations,
and principles that are intended to direct the conduct of states in their international dealings with one
another." Christopher Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and InternationalLaw: Reflections on the United
Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
28.
29.

ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW (1981).
See LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (1979).

30.
31.
32.

Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 26.
Id. art. 12(l)(b).
Id. art. 10.
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The European Community provides examples of the distinctions among
implementation, compliance, and enforcement. It is said that the European
Community has an "implementation deficit."33 States often fail to adopt
domestic laws to put into effect Community directives. When they fail to
adopt these laws, they fail to implement. When they fail to implement, they
fail to comply with the Treaty of Rome. The Community can take states to
the European Court of Justice to get an authoritative ruling on a failure to
implement, but at present the Court has almost no capacity to enforce its
decisions. With the adoption of the Maastricht treaty, the Court is given the
ability to impose fines on states that fail to comply with obligations.
Depending on how the fines may be collected, the Court may gain
enforcement capacity.
In the Mexico-U.S. case, Mexico failed to implement techniques to
protect dolphins. It thereby failed to comply with a customary international
law obligation to prevent damage to the marine environment. This failure
gave rise to the right of the United States to take enforcement action.34
B. Enforcement Action
International law, lacking a police force, embraces two other means of
forcefully enforcing international law obligations: through domestic legal
institutions with the use of armed force, or by using countermeasures.
Employing domestic legal institutions to enforce international law is
clearly the most efficient means of enforcement. The greatest quantity of
international law is probably enforced through domestic courts. On the
other hand, this can only lead to enforcement against the government of the
state where enforcement is sought or against any individuals who must
comply with an international obligation. It is rare for domestic courts to
enforce an international legal obligation against a foreign state. In the
United States the courts have in recent years narrowed the opportunities for
such enforcement.35

33. Comment of Ernst Klatte, European Community DG XI (Information and Communication)
May 18, 1993.
34. See infra part I1.
35. The Sabbatino Case is probably the best known example of parties trying to use U.S. courts
to enforce international law. In that case plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court should find Cuba in
violation of international law. The Court found that the Act of State Doctrine applied to the question
and would not rule. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 3989 (1964). For a thorough
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But individuals and environmental groups can, for example, bring a suit
against the U.S. government for failing to administer an international treaty
incorporated into U.S. law. For example, the Vienna Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer is implemented in domestic law and citizens
may sue the government for failing to comply.36 Should the government
fail to obey a court order to comply, the courts may levy fines or, it is even
accepted that the army may come to the assistance of the courts. a7 More
significantly for international environmental law, the United States will
enforce the Vienna Convention against those of its own citizens who might
violate the Convention's obligations, as incorporated in U.S. law. It is
because of cases like these that we say the greatest quantity of international
law is enforced through domestic institutions.
While the use of domestic institutions is the most common means of
enforcing international law, the use of force is the least common means. In
some rare cases, states or the U.N. may use force to enforce international
obligations. Basically, states may use force in self-defense.38 According
to the International Court of Justice this means states may use force when
responding to an armed attack.39 Even if faced with an imminent, fatal
threat due to a breach of an environmental obligation by a state, the victim
state would not be allowed to use force.
The U.N. may use force in response to a threat to, or breach of,
international peace. 4° This means it probably has a broader right to use
force than individual states. If an imminent melt-down of a nuclear reactor
or a similar event were about to occur, presumably the U.N. could send

discussion of the capacity of U.S. courts to hear cases against foreign sovereigns under international or
U.S. domestic law, see BORN & WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1992).
In the case of individuals, they will most often be subject to international law when incorporated
in U.S. law. For example, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, whether U.S. citizens or not, must comply
with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3,
1973, 12 I.L.M. 1085. This is incorporated in U.S. law in the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1531-43 (Supp. 1991). See, e.g., Man Hing Ivory and Imports, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1982). For a further discussion of this subject, see CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN DOMESTIC COURTS (1980).

36. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 26, at 1529;
implemented at 42 U.S.C. § 7671 (Supp. IV 1992).
37. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
38. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's
Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 SO. ILL. L.J. 453-86 (1991).
39. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Around Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4
(June 27).
40. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 39.
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"blue helmets" to prevent loss of life, especially where the Security Council
believed the victim state might respond with force following such a
disaster.4 The U.N. has never taken forceful action in the environmental
area and the likelihood of its doing so seems slim. It has plenty of
difficulty at the present moment responding to unlawful use of force and
massive human rights abuse.
The only other method of enforcement on the international plane is the
use of countermeasures. Countermeasures are actions taken in response to
a prior unfriendly or unlawful action.4 2 Unfriendly, though lawful actions,
such as withdrawing diplomats, are also known as retorsions. States may
always take unfriendly actions. They may take unlawful actions only when
the prior action was unlawful. Unlawful countermeasures are also known
as reprisals. They must be necessary and proportional. By necessary, we
mean that the responding state must at least first request that the acting state
comply with its obligations before imposing countermeasures. The meaning
of proportional is not as well understood.4 3 The Tuna case, however,
provides a good example. In that instance, the United States wanted Mexico
to reform its tuna fishing techniques, per Mexico's obligation under
customary international law. The United States cut off imports of tuna
pending these reforms. The United States' action might have been out of
proportion if it had embargoed all trade with Mexico as we did in the
Hostages case and in the Gulf War.
The United States is the chief user of countermeasures. Their use
against China in response to its human rights record continues to be
discussed.' Congress has added provisions in various -statutes to use both
retorsions and reprisals to respond to abuses of human rights and breaches
of international environmental law.45 The executive branch regularly

41. Compare the rationale for imposing an embargo on Rhodesia. The Council ordered the
embargo to respond to the threat of force by Rhodesia's neighbors following the unilateral declaration
of independence.
42. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 541-42.
43. See O'Connell, supra note 24, at 927.
44. Michael Richardson, Value Clash Looms for US. and Asia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 3,
1993, at I.
45. In the environmental area, see the MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988); the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§1801-82 (1988 & Supp. II 1991);
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §1821(c)(2) (1988); the Driftnet Impact
Monitoring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, 16 U.S.C. §1822 note (1988 & Supp. 1111991); the
Driftnet Act Amendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. §1826 (1988); and the Pelly Amendment to the 1967
Fisherman's Protective Act, 22 U.S.C. §1978 (1988). See also Ted McDorman, The GA 7T Consistency
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employs retorsions and reprisals to respond to treaty breaches, unlawful uses
of force and human rights abuses.
The United States' employment of countermeasures is understandable
since they are the only available tool for lawfully applying coercion
peacefully under international law. But the very fact that it is the United
States which uses them so frequently points out one of the disadvantages of
countermeasures-they will be far more available to wealthy countries than
to poor ones. States holding assets to freeze or valuable markets to close
can do both as countermeasures. Poor states will often have few resources
available for leverage. Even when resources are available, these states may
need to be able to withstand counter-countermeasures to effectively use the
countermeasure. Thus some see countermeasures as fundamentally unfair
and therefore question their acceptability in a legal system.
Another central drawback of countermeasures is that they are selfjudging. Lacking a compulsory judicial system, it will be a rare case where
a state will have an objective third-party decision finding a wrong and
authorizing the wronged state to use countermeasures. Most often the state
choosing to take such measures will take them based only on its own
assessment. In some cases, the international community may respond
negatively to the imposition of measures, making it clear that the court of
world opinion disagrees with the state's assessment. Such a negative
response can play the role of an objective third-party assessment. In other
cases, however, it must be accepted that international opinion will be
ignored and the wronged state may have little recourse. Several of these
issues surrounding countermeasures arose in the tuna dispute.
II.

EMBARGOING TUNA AS A COUNTERMEASURE

The following description of the process of catching yellowfin tuna in
the Eastern Pacific clearly reveals why Congress began its investigation into
the protection of dolphins.
In the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) schools of yellowfin
tuna typically forage for food beneath herds of dolphin. Biologists
do not fully understand why the two species travel together. ...
of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop DriftnetFishing and Save Whales, Dolphinsand Turtles, 24 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477 (1991)

(discussing these acts).
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Both American and foreign commercial tuna fishermen exploit
this phenomenon. Fishing vessels chase the visible dolphin herds
in hopes of locating schools of yellowfin that may be below. When
the boats catch up with the dolphin herd, purse seine nets are used
to catch the tuna in a process known as 'setting on dolphin."'
Purse seine are house-sized nets with weights and floats that become
sack-like, open bottom traps. The dolphin are herded into the upper
part of the nets, while the lower part lands to confine the tuna
following below. The bottom of the net is then pulled closed, like
purse strings, trapping both the tuna and the air breathing dolphin.
Setting on dolphin is not a peaceful procedure. The terrified and
exhausted dolphin are driven into the center of the nets by
explosives and high-speed chase boats. Many dolphin drown
immediately as they are crowded into increasingly tight space,
unable to reach the surface to breathe. Others are battered against
the speed boats or the main ship and suffer serious injuries. The
result is often a bloody and horrifyingly confused struggle in which
the dolphin are mutilated, their beaks and flippers broken or ripped
from their bodies as they become entangled in the nets or are
crushed to death against the ship's power block. The bewildered
dolphin try to escape. .

.

. Ironically, after creating this gruesome

scene, in many instances the fishermen find that there are no tuna
below the herd.46
Before countries began taking protective measures, as many as 300,000
dolphins a year were being killed this way in the process of catching only
five percent of all tuna consumed. 7 In the 1960s, U.S. public pressure to
stop the slaughter of dolphins was very strong. Scientific evidence showed
that some subspecies had declined by as much as eighty percent following
the introduction of purse seining in the 1960s.48 In response, Congress
adopted the Marine Mammal Protection Act in 1972. 49 The general

46. Caroline E. Coulston, Flipper Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorizationof the Marine
Mammal Protection Act and its Effect on Dolphin, II J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 97,

101-02 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 122. Ross, supra note 9, at 346.
Coulston, supra note 46, at 103.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
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obligation of the Act is to forbid the taking and importation of marine
mammals.5 ° But under pressure from the economically-troubled U.S. tuna
fishing fleet, an exception was made for dolphins. The fleet could apply for
an exemption and has for many years been allowed to kill more than 20,000
dolphins in the course of catching yellowfin tuna. To make sure the Act did
not simply shift the slaughter of dolphins from U.S. to foreign fishermen,
the Act also required that foreign fishermen refrain from killing dolphins.
They could kill more dolphins per year but not significantly more. The
result of doing so would be a ban on importation of tuna from such
countries. In 1984 and 1988 the provisions regarding foreign countries were
strengthened by Congress when it became clear the Executive branch was
not enforcing the Act.5 The amendments strengthened the evidentiary
requirement of foreign importers to show that tuna was not caught with
purse seine nets, that the country had a program regarding fishing regulation
in place, and that it would cooperate in scientific research programs.
Further, the United States would not import tuna processed in countries that
bought tuna caught without regard for dolphins.52
Environmentalists were generally disappointed with these provisions.
They had lobbied for a complete ban on the killing of dolphins. They
argued that other methods besides "setting on dolphin" are available for
harvesting tuna and that killing such large numbers of dolphins for such a
small percentage of the tuna harvest made little environmental sense.53
Nevertheless, the small Association of American Tunaboats kept the
Congress from adopting a complete ban. That Association has shrunk from
more than ninety members in the 1960s to fewer than forty in the 1990s.
While it is disputed that environmental regulation caused this decline, the
fact must have impressed Congress enough for it to grant concessions to the
industry. The MMPA permits some dolphins to be killed by Americans and
requires that foreign fishermen make some effort to reduce the kill rate.
A number of countries have come close to having tuna exports
embargoed. However, in all cases the countries were able to meet the U.S.
requirements, except Panama, which had imports embargoed in 1990 and
Mexico, which had imports embargoed in 1991 as a result of a lawsuit to

50.
5 1.
52.
53.

16 U.S.C. §1371 (1988).
McDorman, supra note 45, at 492.
Id. at 493.
See Coulston, supra note 46, at 122.
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compel the executive branch to enforce the MMPA against it.14 Mexico,
unhappy with the embargo, took the United States to a GATT dispute
resolution panel ifi Geneva."
The GATT panel found that the MMPA embargo provisions violate
GATT Article XI's prohibition of quantitative restrictions. 56Nvehe
Nevertheless,
the GATT has exceptions to Article XI and other obligations in Article XX.
Article XX(b) allows exceptions for the protection of life and health of
wildlife and XX(g) allows exceptions for the conservation of exhaustible
resources. Astonishingly, the GATT panel found these provisions did not
apply and for basically an erroneous reason. Despite the fact that the
articles have no geographic limit, the panel said that they only apply to
measures applicable within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. If the
United States wishes to protect wildlife outside its borders, the panel
suggested that it negotiate a treaty to do so.
This finding shows little understanding of international law. States are
bound by customary international law, not just treaties. Significant evidence
now exists that states have an obligation to take scientifically supported
steps to protect the environment beyond national boundaries.57 This
obligation rests on Mexico, Panama, and others that do not take steps to
protect wildlife on the high seas-science has demonstrated that "setting on
dolphin" with purse seine nets is highly damaging and that other methods
are available. The United States has the right, if not the duty, under general
international law to enforce this obligation against all violators. It has this
right because areas beyond national jurisdiction have no protectors except
the collective states. Moreover, the environment is not so easily divisible
as the panel seems to suggest. In addition, failing to protect wildlife in the
high seas can result in injuries to the U.S. domestic environment. 8 It is
not known whether the United States made this argument to the panel,
though it probably would not have persuaded a panel focused on protecting
trade first.
The panel also found that the tie to the U.S. incidental kill rate made the
obligation unpredictable and, therefore, they concluded the Act was not

54. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
55. Mexicans ask GA 7T to Settle Tuna Row, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1991, at 5.
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 1618.
57. O'Connell, supra note 2, at 332.
58. Id. at 328.
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aimed primarily at conservation. This finding is equally questionable. The
panel did not find that the measure was in any sense intended to protect the
U.S. fishing industry. 9 What other purpose beyond conservation could it
then have? Indeed, the Association of American Tunaboats has argued for
twenty years that the Act hurts, rather than helps, the U.S. fishing industry.
Moreover, the Act is supported by scientific evidence.60 It is true that the
formula for finding an allowable foreign kill rate could make the rate
unpredictable, but since the rate has been 20,000 for many years, the rate
could be argued to be stable. As it is higher than the U.S. rate, the burden
is less than on domestic fishermen. Eliminating the provision for foreign
fishers would only shift the killing from Americans to others.
Congress amended the Act on this point in 1992 to require that foreign
fishers show a decline in the dolphin kill rate based on the foreign fishers'
own past experience. 6 ' Congress also directed the executive branch to
negotiate agreements with other governments to place a moratorium on the
killing of dolphins. It is not clear from the language of the Act whether the
United States will still impose embargoes on tuna imports from those states
that have not negotiated a moratorium agreement. The point of the
amendments seems to be to bring the United States into compliance with the
panel's decision.
While the MMPA may have been saved from violating the GATT, a
number of articles have appeared lately applying the GATT panel's decision
to the Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer, the Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species, and the Basel Convention on
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste.6 2 All three conventions
may be inconsistent with the panel's decision. They remain to date,
however, unchallenged before the GATT.
Reforming the GATT to protect these conventions and to raise the value
of environmental protection generally in the GATT is currently a major goal

59. But cf United States Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna Productsfrom Canada, GATT
Doc. L/5198 (Feb. 22, 1982), reprinted in LAW AND PRACTICE UNDER THE GATT [1981-82] 1-27

(Kenneth R. Simmonds and Brian H.W. Hill eds., 1993) (holding that U.S. prohibition against Canadian
tuna violates GATT).
60. See Coulston, supra note 46, at 103.
61.
62.

16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988), as amended by Pub. L. No. 102-523, § 305 (1992).
See, e.g., J.O. CAMERON ET AL., RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND
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of environmentalists. 63 The panel's decision in the Tuna case shows a
value preference for free trade over environmental protection. If the panel
had valued the environment, it need not have read in geographical limits
into Article XX.M6 Then the U.S. action would have been categorized as
a retorsion-a lawful action taken in response to a prior unlawful action.
As it was, the panel found the action unlawful, so in its view the
embargo was a reprisal-type countermeasure. Even as amended, the MMPA
probably remains in this category. But, as such and even without GATT
reform, it was still lawful for the United States to take the action as long as
it was proportional and necessary. Because the U.S. embargo was only of
tuna products taken in a process that unnecessarily killed dolphins, it
appears to be eminently proportional. It was taken only after years of
negotiation and attempts to make Mexico limit its use of purse seine nets.65
Even though a good case exists that the measures the United States took
were proportional and necessary, because the GATT has its own dispute
resolution provisions, it might be argued that it is a "self-contained regime"
that excludes the use of unilateral measures inconsistent with its
provisions. 66 The International Court of Justice introduced the term "selfcontained regime" in the Hostages Case to respond to Iran's arguments that
it had permitted the kidnapping of diplomatic hostages in violation of the

63. FIN. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at 5, 13.
64. Besides the GATT panel decision and the total absence of discussion of the environment in
GATT negotiations, Director General Dunkel further underscored the GATT's position on the
environment when he said:
Production and consumption activities in other countries can also be a source of domestic
environmental concern. Pollution may be spilling over borders and harming either the
regional environment (acid rain) or the global commons (ozone depletion).

Or land

development projects may be threatening the extinction of an animal or plant species, and
uncontrolled fishing may be depleting fish stock on the high seas. It is not unreasonable that
the government of a country concerned by such practices would seek to see them
changed-and that it would find it difficult to accept that this would not be possible.... In
principle it is not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's own market dependent
on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the exporting country.
Robert Housman and Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A Primer,
15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 535, 539-40 (1992).

Many are concerned about priorities at the GATT. Ralph Nader is a particularly vocal critic of the
GATT. Nancy Dunne, A Consuming Interest in Trade, FIN. TIMES, May 18, 1993, at 4; FIN. TIMES,
supra note 63.
65. See McDorman, supra note 45.
66.

See

ELISABETH

ZOLLER,

COUNTERMEASUREs 84-93 (1984).
(1985).

PEACETIME

UNILATERAL

REMEDIES:

AN

ANALYSIS

OF

Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 11

GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL

[Vol. 1: 273

diplomatic immunity regimes as, in essence, a countermeasure for other
crimes the United States had committed against Iran. The Court pointed out
that diplomatic treaties had their own remedies-diplomats may be declared
persona non grata and expelled. No room exists for kidnapping them as
remedies for other wrongs.67
The GATT is probably not such a self-contained regime that permits no
use of remedies outside those of the GATT itself. The diplomatic regime
has a unique need to be self-contained. Actions against human beings
should not be used as countermeasures.68 In addition, we have the
example of the Air Services case, where a treaty regime had a dispute
settlement mechanism, but nonetheless, the dispute resolution panel found
that unilateral measures could be carried out.69 Moreover, the practice of
states after forty-seven years of experience under the GATT rebuts the
argument that the GATT is a self-contained regime. States have imposed
embargoes and other trade sanctions to enforce all manner of international
legal obligations from the prohibition on the use of force to the protection
of human rights.7" The GATT contains no special reason why trade
sanctions can be used in so many cases but not to enforce environmental
protection.
In addition to the self-contained regime argument, some have also
argued that because dolphins are not protected by treaty, Mexico violated no
international law and therefore the United States had no right to take a
countermeasure. The GATT panel itself suggested that the United States
could only defend its action by showing an international treaty that protected
dolphins. Perhaps the United States did not make clear at the GATT that

67. ZOLLER, supra note 66, at 90-91.
68. See O'Connell, supra note 24.
69. Air Services Agreement Case, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
70. According to Carter, "although some GATT experts are uncomfortable about the frequent use
of these types of controls [against terrorism or human rights violations], it seems unlikely that there will
be any significant challenge to these controls in GATT in the near future." BARRY CARTER,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 96-97 (1988). One of the most recent example of the use of
trade controls for human rights is the action in Haiti. In 1992 the United States and the Organization
of American States ordered a trade embargo against Haiti, which is a member of the GATT.
WASHINGTON POST, June 4, 1992 at A24. European countries did not participate in the embargo, saying
it would be illegal for them to do so until ordered to by the Security Council. The Council ordered all
U.N. members to participate in the embargo in June of 1993. MIAMI HERALD, June 17, 1993 at Al.
(The GATT itself has no exception for Security Council orders. But the U.N. Charter in Article 103
makes clear that the Charter, and impliedly actions taken under the Charter, take precedence over other
treaties.)
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it could take such measures to enforce customary environmental law and
that now customary environmental law requires the taking of steps to
prevent damage to the environment."
This may seem like a vague
standard, and that is one of its weaknesses, but the actions required to be
taken must be consistent with scientific evidence. Some environmentalists
now argue that international law now embraces a doctrine called the
precautionary principle, which requires states to take action not only based
on scientific evidence, but also on evidence that is not scientific. The basis
on which states must act under this doctrine is truly uncertain.72 By
comparison, any state may point to sound scientific evidence as the basis for
pressing another state to reform. Probably the best approach to enforcing
these principles is to hold negotiations beforehand to discuss precisely what
is required for prevention and how such steps can be carried out." Such
negotiations are in any case required before countermeasures may be
implemented. The United States and Mexico have carried out such
negotiations. When Mexico made no move to stop its destructive practices
the United States was entitled to take countermeasures.
Article 12 of the recent Rio Declaration on the Environment states,
"unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the
jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided."74
This
requirement is not binding per se since the Declaration is not binding. But
even if it were, the United States acted consistently with it. The article says
countermeasures should be "avoided." The regime of counter-measures
itself contains a parallel limitation. Countermeasures may only be used
when necessary. As argued above, necessity is proven when good faith
negotiation has proven fruitless. At that point countermeasures need no
longer be "avoided."75

71. O'Connell, supra note 2.
72. For a statement finding the precautionary principle to be incorporated in customary
international law, see Phillippe Sands, The "Greening" of InternationalLaw: Emerging Principlesand
Rules, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293. See also DAVID FREESTONE, THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 21 (R. Churchill & D. Freestone

eds., 1991). This article provides only slim evidence of the existence of such a principle.
73. See O'Connell, supra note 2.
74. The Rio Declarationon Environment andDevelopment, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992).
75. It could be argued that the GATT dispute resolution panel made an objective, third-party
decision that the MMPA is not concerned with environmental protection and therefore countermeasures
to enforce the MMPA are unlawful. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Generally it would be
a desideratum to have objective third-party decisions on the legality of countermeasures so that states
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For some this may seem like a far too anarchic system that gives too
much leeway to states like the United States to enforce what they wish and
then to call it law. To some extent, this is an accurate account of the
international system. Professors of trade law, in particular, have reacted
strongly to the right of states to take unilateral measures inconsistent with
GATT substantive rules. They are plainly concerned that 114 member states
acting unilaterally will undermine the trading regime. Yet, the GATT itself
serves a restraining function. In order to prove the countermeasure aims at
protecting environmental obligations, those same environmental obligations
must be imposed on the state's own citizens, in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
States are unlikely to do so frivolously. Nor have the complaining trade
lawyers explained why, when trade has been used for forty years to enforce
international law obligations inconsistent with the GATT, the fear of the
GATT's disintegration is only raised now. If the Germans embargoed
products from Bulgaria to induce it to close down a nuclear reactor on the
verge of melt-down, even professors of trade law would probably not cite
the GATT against them. But the principles under which Germany would be
permitted to do that are the same as the ones that permitted the United
States to embargo Mexican-processed fish. We see here a clash of values
between keeping dolphins off the endangered species list and protecting
Mexico's comparative advantage in fishing.
To some it may be that dolphins constitute the "wrong" case, while
nuclear reactors are the "right" case for using countermeasures.
International law, however, does not currently limit the use of remedies to
only some categories of wrongs and not others. Countermeasures are
limited by the doctrines of necessity and proportionality. Even with these
restraints, it is admitted that countermeasures are problematic. But it is also
admitted that they remain the only means of enforcing international
environmental law on the international plane. The United States has the
legal right to include them in existing and future legislation.

do not judge the legality for themselves. On the other hand, this panel had only the law of the GATT
under consideration and not wider international law; thus, its decision has little bearing on the right of
the U.S. to take a countermeasure in this case.
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III. CONCLUSION

The discussion over how bst to protect the international environment
will be with us for some time to come. New treaty and customary rules are
being developed quickly. But the means of enforcing them remain few and
inadequate. Indeed, it was argued here that countermeasures are the only
lawful means of enforcing international environmental law. The United
States is the chief user of countermeasures and has adopted their use in a
number of statutes designed to ensure that efforts to protect the international
environment are effective, without damaging U.S. competitiveness. A
dispute resolution panel of the GATT found, however, that their use in the
Tuna case was inconsistent with the GATT. It may be that the GATT will
be reformed to allow for greater environmental protection. In the meantime,
however, violating the GATT for environmental protection, within the
parameters of the rules governing countermeasures, is lawful under
international law.

